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Abstract
A new way is presented to de¯ne for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-)
games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976. The Bird
core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity
properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst-problems
is a selection of the Bird core correspondence. Using the additivity property
an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core correspondence is obtained.
Key-words: cost allocation, minimum cost spanning tree games, Bird core,
cost monotonicity, cone additivity.
JEL classi¯cation: C71.
1 Introduction
One of the classical problems in Operations Research is the problem of ¯nd-
ing a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) in a connected network. For al-
gorithms solving this problem see Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957). Claus
and Kleitman (1973) discuss the problem of allocating costs among users in
1Department of Mathematics, University of Genoa, Italy and CentER and Department
of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
2Department of Mathematics, University of Genoa and Department of Environmental
Epidemiology, National Cancer Research Institute of Genoa, Italy.
3Faculty of Computer Science, \Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iasi, Romania.
4CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg Univer-
sity, The Netherlands.2
a minimum cost spanning tree. This inspired independently Bird (1976) and
Granot and Claus (1976) to construct and use a cooperative game to tackle
this cost allocation problem.
In the seminal paper of Bird (1976) a method is indicated how to ¯nd
a core element of the minimum cost spanning tree game (mcst game) when
a minimum cost spanning tree is given. Further he has introduced, using a
¯xed mcst, the irreducible core of an mcst game, which is a subset of the
core of the game, and which we will call in this paper the Bird core. The
Bird core is central in this paper. First, we will give a new \tree free" way
to introduce the Bird core by constructing for each mcst-problem a related
problem, where the weight function is a non-Archimedean semimetric. The
Bird core correspondence turns out to be a crucial correspondence if one is
interested in stable cost monotonic allocation rules for mcst-problems. In
fact, the Bird core is the \largest" among the correspondences which are
cost monotonic and stable. The Bird core has also an interesting additivity
property i.e. the Bird core correspondence is additive on each Kruskal cone
in the space of mcst-problems with a ¯xed number of users. The additivity
on Kruskal cones can be used to ¯nd an axiomatic characterization of the
Bird core correspondence.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 settles notions and
notations. In Section 3 the non-Archimedean semimetric is introduced and
used to de¯ne in a canonical (tree independent) way the reduced game and
the Bird core. The relations between stable cost monotonic rules and the
Bird core are discussed in Section 4. An axiomatic characterization of the
Bird core is given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries and notations
An (undirected) graph is a pair < V;E >, where V is a set of vertices or
nodes and E is a set of edges e of the form fi;jg with i;j 2 V , i 6= j.
The complete graph on a set V of vertices is the graph < V;EV >, where
EV = ffi;jgji;j 2 V and i 6= jg. A path between i and j in a graph < V;E >
is a sequence of nodes (i0;i1;:::;ik), where i = i0 and j = ik, k ¸ 1, and
such that fis;is+1g 2 E for each s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. A cycle in < V;E > is
a path from i to i for some i 2 V . A path (i0;i1;:::;ik) is without cycles if
there do not exist a;b 2 f0;1;:::;kg, a 6= b, such that ia = ib.
Two nodes i;j 2 V are connected in < V;E > if i = j or if there exists a
path between i and j in < V;E >. A connected component of V in < V;E >
is a maximal subset of V with the property that any two nodes in this subset
are connected in < V;E >. Given a path P = (i0;i1;:::;ik) between i and3
j in a graph < V;E >, k ¸ 1, we say that v 2 V is a node in P if v = im
for some m 2 f0;:::;kg; we say that an edge fr;tg 2 E is on the path P
or, equivalently, that i is connected to j via the edge fr;tg in the path P, if
there exists m 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g such that r = im and t = im+1 or t = im and
r = im+1.
Now, we consider minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. In an
mcst situation a set N = f1;:::;ng of agents is involved willing to be con-
nected as cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a service) denoted
by 0. In the sequel we use the notation N0 for N [ f0g. An mcst situation
can be represented by a tuple < N0;EN0;w >, where < N0;EN0 > is the com-
plete graph on the set N0 of nodes or vertices, and w : EN0 ! I R+ is a map
which assigns to each edge e 2 EN0 a nonnegative number w(e) representing
the weight or cost of edge e. We call w a weight function. If w(e) 2 f0;1g
for every e 2 EN0, the weight function w is called a simple weight function,
and we refer then to < N0;EN0;w > as a simple mcst situation. Since in
our paper the graph of possible edges is always the complete graph, we sim-
ply denote an mcst situation with the set of users N, source 0, and weight
function w by < N0;w >. Often we identify an mcst situation < N0;w >
with the corresponding weight function w. We denote by WN0 the set of all
mcst situations < N0;w > (or w) with node set N0. For each S µ N one
can consider the mcst subsituation < S0;wjS0 >, where S0 = S [ f0g and
wjS0 : ES0 ! I R+ is the restriction of the weight function w to ES0 µ EN0,
i.e. wjS0(e) = w(e) for each e 2 ES0.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. Two nodes i and j are called
(w;N0)-connected if i = j or if there exists a path (i0;:::;ik) from i to j,
with w(fis;is+1g) = 0 for every s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. A (w;N0)-component of
N0 is a maximal subset of N0 with the property that any two nodes in this
subset are (w;N0)-connected. We denote by Ci(w) the (w;N0)-component
to which i belongs and by C(w) the set of all the (w;N0)-components of N0.
Clearly, the collection of (w;N0)-components forms a partition of N0.
We de¯ne the set §EN0 of linear orders on EN0 as the set of all bijections
¾ : f1;:::;jEN0jg ! EN0, where jEN0j is the cardinality of the set EN0. For
each mcst situation < N0;w > there exists at least one linear order ¾ 2 §EN0





For any ¾ 2 §EN0 we de¯ne the set
K
¾ = fw 2 I R
EN0
+ j w(¾(1)) · w(¾(2)) · ::: · w(¾(jEN0j))g;
which we call the Kruskal cone with respect to ¾. One can easily see that S
¾2§EN0 K¾ = I R
EN0
+ . For each ¾ 2 §EN0 the cone K¾ is a simplicial cone4
with generators e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg, where
e¾;k(¾(1)) = e¾;k(¾(2)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(k ¡ 1)) = 0
and
e¾;k(¾(k)) = e¾;k(¾(k + 1)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(jEN0j)) = 1:
(1)
[Note that e¾;1(¾(k)) = 1 for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg]. This implies that each
w 2 K¾ can be written in a unique way as non-negative linear combination










Clearly, we can also write WN0 =
S
¾2§EN0 K¾, if we identify an mcst situa-
tion < N0;w > with w.
Any mcst situation w 2 WN0 gives rise to two problems: the construction
of a network ¡ µ EN0 of minimal cost connecting all users to the source, and
a cost sharing problem of distributing this cost in a fair way among users.
The cost of a network ¡ is w(¡) =
P
e2¡ w(e). A network ¡ is a spanning
network on S0 µ N0 if for every e 2 ¡ we have e 2 ES0 and for every
i 2 S there is a path in ¡ from i to the source. Given a spanning network
¡ on N0 we de¯ne the set of edges of ¡ with nodes in S0 µ N0 as the set
E¡
S0 = ffi;jgjfi;jg 2 ¡ and i;j 2 S0g.
For any mcst situation w 2 WN0 it is possible to determine at least
one spanning tree on N0, i.e. a spanning network without cycles on N0, of
minimum cost; each spanning tree of minimum cost is called an mcst for N0 in
w or, shorter, an mcst for w. Two famous algorithms for the determination
of minimum cost spanning trees are the algorithm of Prim (Prim (1957))
and the algorithm of Kruskal (Kruskal (1956)). The cost of a minimum cost
spanning network ¡ on N0 in a simple mcst situation w equals jC(w)j¡1 (see
Lemma 2 in Norde et al. (2004)).
Now, let us introduce some basic game theoretical notations. A coopera-
tive cost game is a pair (N;c) where N = f1;:::;ng is a ¯nite (player-)set
and the characteristic function c : 2N ! I R assigns to each subset S 2 2N,
called a coalition, a real number c(S), called the cost of coalition S, where
2N stands for the power set of the player set N, and c(;) = 0. The core of a
game (N;c) is the set of payo® vectors for which no coalition has an incentive
to leave the grand coalition N, i.e.









Note that the core of a game can be empty. A game (N;c) is called a concave
game if the marginal contribution of any player to any coalition is more than
his marginal contribution to a larger coalition, i.e. if it holds that
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) ¸ c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T): (3)
for all i 2 N and all S µ T µ N n fig.
An order ¿ of N is a bijection ¿ : f1;:::;jNjg ! N. This order is denoted
by ¿(1);:::;¿(n), where ¿(i) = j means that with respect to ¿, player j is in
the i-th position. We denote by §N the set of possible orders on the set N.
Let (N;c) be a cooperative cost game. For ¿ 2 §N, the marginal vector
m¿(c) is de¯ned by
m
¿
i(c) = c([i;¿]) ¡ c((i;¿)) for all i 2 N;
where [i;¿] = fj 2 N : ¿¡1(j) · ¿¡1(i)g is the set of predecessors of i with
respect to ¿ including i, and (i;¿) = fj 2 N : ¿¡1(j) < ¿¡1(i)g is the set of
predecessors of i with respect to ¿ excluding i. In a coherent way with respect
to previous notations, we will indicate the set [i;¿] [ f0g and (i;¿) [ f0g
as [i;¿]0 and (i;¿)0, respectively. For instance, for each k 2 f1;:::;jNjg
and for each l 2 f2;:::;jNjg, the set [¿(k);¿]0 = f0;¿(1);:::;¿(k)g and
(¿(l);¿)0 = f0;¿(1);:::;¿(l ¡ 1)g, which will be denoted shorter as [¿(k)]0
and (¿(l))0, respectively.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. The minimum cost spanning tree
game (N;cw) (or simply cw), corresponding to < N0;w >, is de¯ned by
cw(S) = minfw(¡)j¡ is a spanning network on S
0g
for every S 2 2Nnf;g, with the convention that cw(;) = 0.
We denote by MCST
N the class of all mcst games corresponding to mcst
situations in WN0. For each ¾ 2 §EN0, we denote by G¾ the set fcw j w 2 K¾g
which is a cone. We can express MCST




¾2§EN0 G¾, and we would like to point out that MCST
N itself
is not a cone if jNj ¸ 2.
The core C(cw) of an mcst game cw 2 MCST
N is nonempty (Granot and
Huberman (1981), Bird (1976)) and, given an mcst ¡ (with no cycles) for
N0 in mcst situation w, one can easily ¯nd an element in the core looking at
the Bird allocation in w corresponding to ¡, i.e. the cost allocation where
each player i 2 N pays the edge in ¡ which connects him with his immediate
predecessor in < N0;¡ >.
We call a map F : WN0 ! I RN assigning to every mcst situation w a





where ¡ is a minimum cost spanning network on N0 for w.
3 The non-Archimedean semimetric
corresponding to an mcst situation
Let w 2 WN0. For each path P = (i0;i1;:::;ik) from i to j in the graph
< N0;EN0 > we denote the set of its edges by E(P), that is E(P) =
ffi0;i1g;fi1;i2g;:::;fik¡1;ikgg. Moreover, we call maxe2E(P) w(e) the top
of the path P and denote it by t(P). We denote by PN0
ij the set of all paths
without cycles from i to j in the graph < N0;EN0 >.
Now we de¯ne the key concept of this section, namely the reduced weight
function.
De¯nition 1 Let w 2 WN0. The reduced weight function ¹ w is given by









for each i;j 2 N0, i 6= j.
Now, extending ¹ w by putting ¹ w(i;i) = 0 for each i 2 N0, we obtain a
nonnegative function on the set of all pairs of elements in N0. The obtained
reduced weight function ¹ w is a semimetric on N0 with the sharp triangle
inequality, i.e. a non-Archimedean (NA-)semimetric. In formula, for each
i;j;k 2 N0
¹ w(i;j) ¸ 0 and ¹ w(i;i) = 0 (non-negativity);
¹ w(i;j) = ¹ w(j;i) (symmetry);
¹ w(i;k) · maxf ¹ w(i;j); ¹ w(j;k)g (sharp triangle inequality):
The proof is left to the reader. If w > 0, then ¹ w is a non-Archimedean metric
on the set N0.
For the reduced weight function ¹ w we have a special property related to
triangles, as the next lemma shows.
Proposition 1 (The isoscele triangle property) Let ¹ w be the reduced
weight function corresponding to w 2 WN0 and i;j;k 2 N0 such that ¹ w(i;j) ·
¹ w(i;k) and ¹ w(i;j) · ¹ w(k;j). Then ¹ w(i;k) = ¹ w(j;k).7
Proof By the sharp triangle inequality ¹ w(i;k) · maxf ¹ w(i;j); ¹ w(j;k)g =
¹ w(j;k) and ¹ w(j;k) · maxf ¹ w(j;i); ¹ w(i;k)g = ¹ w(i;k).
So ¹ w(i;k) = ¹ w(j;k).
This property for NA-semimetrics will be useful in proving that there are
many minimum cost spanning trees for (N0; ¹ w), as we see in Theorem 1.
Unless otherwise clear from the context, in the sequel we simply refer
to ¹ w as the mcst situation which assigns to each edge fi;jg 2 EN0 the
reduced weight value as de¯ned in equality (??). Further, we will denote by
¹ WN0 ½ WN0 the set of all NA-semimetric mcst situations which assign to
each edge fi;jg 2 EN0 the distance ¹ w(i;j) provided by a NA-semimetric ¹ w
on N0.
Example 1 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 1. Note that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;2g;
¾(2) = f1;0g; ¾(3) = f1;3g; ¾(4) = f3;0g; ¾(5) = f2;0g; ¾(6) = f2;3g.






























































Figure 2: The mcst situation ¹ w corresponding to w.
One main result in this section, Proposition 2, concerns an interesting relation
which can be established between the mcst situation ¹ w and a minimal mcst8
situation w¡ as de¯ned by Bird (1976), where ¡ is an mcst for N0 in w.
Recall that given an mcst situation w 2 WN0 and an mcst ¡ for N0 in w,
the minimal mcst situation w¡ is de¯ned (cf. Bird, 1976) by w¡(fi;jg) =
maxe2P¡
ij w(e) = t(P ¡
ij), where P ¡
ij 2 PN0
ij is the unique path in ¡ from i to j.
Proposition 2 Let w 2 WN0 and i;j 2 N0. Let ¡ be an mcst for N0 in w
and P ¡







Proof Let P ¤ 2 argminP2PN0
ij t(P) and let e¤ be an edge on P ¤ such that
t(P ¤) = w(e¤). Let ^ e = fm;ng be an edge on P ¡
ij with w(^ e) = t(P ¡
ij).
We have to prove that w(^ e) = w(e¤). If so, then it follows immediately that
minP2PN0
ij t(P) = w(e¤) = w(^ e) = t(P ¡
ij).
If e¤ = ^ e, then of course w(e¤) = w(^ e).
Otherwise, ¯rst note that by de¯nition of e¤
w(^ e) ¸ w(e
¤): (6)
Let Sm be the set of all nodes r 2 N0 such that n is not on the path from
r to m in < N0;¡ >; let Sn be the set of nodes r 2 N0 such that m is not on
the path from r to n in < N0;¡ >, i.e.
Sm = fr 2 N




Sn = fr 2 N
0jm = 2 P
¡
nrg:
Note that fSn;Smg is a partition of N0 and nodes in Sn are connected in
< N0;¡ > to nodes in Sm via edge fm;ng. Moreover, by the de¯nition
of a path without cycles, i;j must belong to di®erent sets of the partition
fSn;Smg. So without loss of generality we suppose that i 2 Sm and j 2 Sn.
Consider the set of edges E+ = fft;vgjt 2 Sm;v 2 Sng. Then,
w(fm;ng) = w(^ e) · w(e); for each e 2 E
+: (7)
In order to prove inequality (7), suppose on the contrary that w(fm;ng) >
w(e) for some e 2 E+. Then the graph ¡+ = (¡ n f^ eg) [ feg would be a
spanning network in N0 cheaper than ¡, which yields a contradiction.
By the de¯nition of a path, for each P 2 PN0
ij there exists at least one
edge e 2 E+ such that e is on the path P. By inequality (7), it follows9
that t(P) ¸ w(e) ¸ w(^ e). This implies that w(e¤) = minP2PN0
ij t(P) ¸ w(^ e).
Together with inequality (6) we have ¯nally w(e¤) = w(^ e).
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2 we have that the mcst situation
¹ w coincides, for each mcst ¡ for w, with the minimal mcst situation w¡ intro-
duced by Bird (1976). So w¡ = w¡0 for each pair of mcst ¡;¡0, a fact which
is already known (cf. Aarts (1994), Feltkamp (1995), Feltkamp et al.(1994)),
but with a complicated proof.
Let w 2 WN0 and let ¡ be an mcst for w. Let ¿ 2 §N. We say that




spanning networks on sets of nodes [¿(1)]0, [¿(2)]0;:::; [¿(jNj)]0, respectively.
Example 2 In Figure 3 is depicted an mcst, denoted by ¡, for the mcst













Figure 3: An mcst ¡ for the mcst situation ¹ w of Figure 2.
¿1(3) = 3 and ¿2(1) = 1; ¿2(2) = 3; ¿2(3) = 2. Note that both ¿1 and ¿2 ¯t
with ¡ but none of the other four elements of §N ¯t with ¡.
Remark 1 Let w 2 WN0, let ¡ be an mcst for w and let ¿ 2 §N be an order




w(e) = cw([¿(r)]) (8)
for each r 2 f1;:::;jNjg. So E¡
[¿(r)]0 is an mcst for the mcst situation
< [¿(r)]0;wj[¿(r)]0 >.
Remark 2 Let w 2 WN0, let ¡ be an mcst for w and let ¿ 2 §N be an
order such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t. The marginal vector m¿(cw) of the mcst game
cw coincides with the Bird allocation in w corresponding to ¡ and therefore
m¿(cw) 2 C(cw), as is proved in Granot and Huberman (1981).10
Remark 3 For each ¾ 2 §EN0 there exists a tree ¡ which is an mcst for
every w 2 K¾; further, there exists a ¿ 2 §N such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t.
These remarkable considerations together with the next lemma prelude to
Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let w 2 ¹ WN0, let ¡ be an mcst for w and let ¿ 2 §N be such
that ¡ and ¿ ¯t. Let r 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g and let ¿0 2 §N be such that
¿0(r) = ¿(r + 1), ¿0(r+1) = ¿(r) and ¿0(i) = ¿(i) for each i 2 f1;:::;jNjgn
fr;r+1g (i.e. ¿0 is obtained from ¿ by a neighbor switch of ¿(r) and ¿(r+1)).
Then there is an mcst ¡0 for w such that ¿0 and ¡0 ¯t.
Proof If ¿(r) is not the immediate predecessor of ¿(r + 1) in ¡ then take
¡0 = ¡ and then ¿0 and ¡ ¯t.
If ¿(r) is the immediate predecessor of ¿(r + 1) in ¡, then let k 2 [¿(r ¡ 1)]0
be the immediate predecessor of ¿(r) in ¡.
First, note that
w(fk;¿(r + 1)g) ¸ w(fk;¿(r)g) (9)
and
w(fk;¿(r + 1)g) ¸ w(f¿(r);¿(r + 1)g) (10)
because ¡ is an mcst for w.
Consider two cases:
c.1) w(fk;¿(r)g) · w(f¿(r);¿(r+1)g). Take ¡0 = (¡nff¿(r);¿(r+1)gg)[
ffk;¿(r + 1)gg. By inequality (9) and the isoscele triangle property
w(fk;¿(r+1)g) = w(f¿(r);¿(r+1)g) and then ¡0 is an mcst in w and
¡0 and ¿0 ¯t.
c.2) w(f¿(r);¿(r + 1)g) < w(fk;¿(r)g). Take ¡0 = (¡ n ffk;¿(r)gg) [
ffk;¿(r + 1)gg. By inequality (10) and the isoscele triangle property
w(fk;¿(r)g) = w(fk;¿(r+1)g) and then ¡0 is an mcst in w and ¡0 and
¿0 ¯t.
Theorem 1 Let w 2 ¹ WN0.Then
i) for each ¿ 2 §N there exists an mcst ¡ such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t.11
ii) Let cw be the mcst game corresponding to w. Then m¿(cw) 2 C(cw) for
all ¿ 2 §N and cw is a concave game.
Proof
i) Let ^ ¡ be an mcst for w. Then there is at least one ^ ¿ 2 §N such
that ^ ¡ and ^ ¿ ¯t. Further each ¿ can be obtained from ^ ¿ by a suitable
sequence of neighbor switches and so, by applying Lemma 1 repeatedly,
we obtain the proof.
ii) Let ¡ be an mcst in N0 for w and let ¿ 2 §N such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t.
By Remark 2, it follows that m¿(cw) coincides with the Bird allocation
corresponding to ¡. Hence, again by Remark 2, m¿(cw) 2 C(cw). Fi-
nally, by the Ichiishi theorem (Ichiishi (1981)) telling that a game is
concave i® all marginal vectors are in the core of the game, it follows
that cw is a concave game.
Let w 2 WN0. We call the core of the mcst game c ¹ w the Bird core of the
mcst game cw and denote it by BC(w). By Theorem 1 it directly follows that
the Bird core BC(w) of the mcst game cw is the convex hull of all the Bird
allocations corresponding to the minimum cost spanning trees for ¹ w. Note
also that BC(w) µ C(cw), since c ¹ w(S) · cw(S) for each S 2 2N n f;g and
c ¹ w(N) = cw(N) (cf. Feltkamp (1995)).
Example 3 Consider the mcst situation w of Figure 1 and the corresponding
reduced mcst situation ¹ w of Figure 2. Then
f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f2;3g f1;3g f1;2;3g
cw 8 12 12 13 24 18 23
c ¹ w 8 8 10 13 18 18 23
There are six minimum cost spanning trees for ¹ w. Three of them lead to the
Bird allocation (8;5;10) and the other three to the Bird allocation (5;8;10).
Further, m¿(c ¹ w) = (8;5;10) for ¿ 2 f(1;2;3);(1;3;2);(3;1;2)g and m¿(c ¹ w) =
(5;8;10) for ¿ 2 f(2;1;3);(2;3;1);(3;2;1)g. The Bird core BC(w) is the con-
vex hull of the marginal vectors of the game c ¹ w, that is BC(w) = convf(8;5;10);
(5;8;10)g ½ C(cw).
4 Monotonicity properties
In Tijs et al.(2004) a class of solutions for mcst situations which are cost
monotonic is introduced: the class of obligation rules. Roughly speaking, we12
de¯ne a cost monotonic solution for mcst situations as a solution such that, if
the costs of some edges increase, then no agent will pay less. More precisely:
De¯nition 2 A solution F : WN0 ! I RN is a cost monotonic solution if for
all mcst situations w;w0 2 WN0 such that w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0, it
holds that F(w) · F(w0).
In this section we introduce a related concept of cost monotonicity for mul-
tisolutions on mcst situations. We call a correspondence G : WN0 ³ I RN
assigning to every mcst situation w a set of cost allocations in I RN a multi-
solution.
De¯nition 3 A multisolution M : WN0 ³ I RN is a cost monotonic multiso-
lution if for all mcst situations w;w0 2 WN0 such that w(e) · w0(e) for each






where compr¡(B) = fx 2 I RNj9b 2 B s.t. xi · bi 8i 2 Ng and compr+(B) =
fx 2 I RNj9b 2 B s.t. bi · xi 8i 2 Ng, for each B ½ I RN.
Before discussing properties of the Bird core as multisolution for mcst situ-
ations, we introduce the following propositions dealing with mcst situations
originated by NA-semimetrics.
Proposition 3 Let w 2 ¹ WN0 and let ¡ be an mcst for w and ¿ 2 §N be





for each j 2 f2;:::;jNjg.
Proof Let j 2 f2;:::;jNjg. Note that by Remark 1
m
¿









Since ¡ and ¿ ¯t, we have E¡
[¿(j)]0 nE¡
(¿(j))0 = ff¿(j);sgg, for some s 2 (¿(j))0.
Because E¡










From (11) and (12) follows the proposition.13
Proposition 4 Let w;w0 2 ¹ WN0 be NA-semimetric mcst situations such
that w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0. Then it holds that
m
¿(cw) · m
¿(cw0) for each ¿ 2 §N:
Proof Let ¿ 2 §N. By Theorem 1 there exist two mcst's ¡ and ¡0 for w
and w0, respectively, such that they both ¯t with ¿. First note that
m
¿










for each j 2 f2;:::;jNjg, where the ¯rst and the second equality follow by
Proposition 3 and the inequality follows from w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0.
Theorem 2 The correspondence BC is a cost monotonic multisolution.
Proof Let w;w0 2 WN0 be such that w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0. By
Theorem 1 and properties of concave games, BC(w) is a convex set whose
extreme points are the marginal vectors of the game c ¹ w, i.e. each element
of BC(w) is a convex combination of marginal vectors of the game c ¹ w. Let
x 2 BC(w). There exist numbers ®¿; ¿ 2 §N; with 0 · ®¿ · 1 for each
¿ 2 §N;
P










¿2§N ®¿ m¿(c ¹ w)
·
P
¿2§N ®¿ m¿(c ¹ w0)
= x0 2 BC(w0);
(14)
where the inequality follows by Proposition 4 and the fact that ¹ w(e) · ¹ w0(e)
for each e 2 EN0 and the second equality by Theorem 1, which proves
BC(w) µ compr¡(BC(w0)). Using a similar argument the other way around
in relations (14), it follows that BC(w0) µ compr+(BC(w)), which concludes
the proof.
To connect the cost monotonicity of the Bird core with cost monotonicity of
obligation rules, we need Proposition 5.14
Proposition 5 Let F : WN0 ! I RN be a cost monotonic and e±cient solu-
tion. Then
i) F(¹ w) = F(w) for every w 2 WN0;
ii) If F is also stable (i.e. F(w0) 2 C(cw0) for every w0 2 WN0), then
F(w) 2 BC(w) for every w 2 WN0.
Proof Let w 2 WN0. First note that by De¯nition 1,
¹ w(e) · w(e) for each e 2 EN0: (15)
Let ¡ be an mcst for w.
i) By inequality (15) and cost monotonicity of F, F( ¹ w) · F(w). On the







So, F(¹ w) = F(w).
ii) By inequality (15),
c ¹ w(S) · cw(S) for all S µ N;
and by De¯nition 1
c ¹ w(N) = cw(N) = w(¡):
Then by stability of F, F( ¹ w) 2 C(c ¹ w) = BC(w) µ C(cw) and by result
(i) F(w) 2 BC(w) too.
Remark 4 Proposition 5 can be extended to multisolutions which are cost
monotonic and e±cient (Property 1 in next section) multisolutions. From
this follows that BC is the \largest" cost monotonic stable multisolution.
Remark 5 As previously said, in Tijs et al.(2004) we introduced the class
of obligation rules and proved that they are both cost monotonic and stable
solutions for mcst situations. So, by Proposition 5 it follows that for each
w 2 WN0, the set F(w) = fÁ(w) j Á is an obligation ruleg is a subset of the
Bird core BC(w) and F(w) = F(¹ w).15
5 An axiomatic characterization of the Bird
core
In order to introduce an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core, we need
to prove the following fact for NA-semimetric mcst situations.
Lemma 2 Let w;w0 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w;w0 2 K¾. Let
®;®0 ¸ 0. Then ® ¹ w;®0 ¹ w0;®w + ®0w0 2 K^ ¾ for some ^ ¾ 2 §EN0.
Proof By formula (4), for each edge e 2 EN0, there is an edge ¹ e 2 EN0 such
that ¹ w(e) = w(¹ e): given that e = fi;jg, ¹ e is such that w(¹ e) = minP2PN0
ij t(P).
Note that for each w1 in the same cone K¾ as w we have ¹ w1(e) = w(¹ e). This
implies that for all pairs of edges e1;e2 2 EN0:
¹ w(e1) · ¹ w(e2) , w(¹ e1) · w(¹ e2) , ¹ w1(e1) · ¹ w1(e2):
So, for each ¹ ¾ 2 §EN0 we have:
¹ w 2 K
¹ ¾ , ¹ w
0 2 K
¹ ¾:
Using this fact, respectively, for ®w; ®0w0 and ®w+®0w0 2 K¾ in the role
of w1, we obtain:
¹ w 2 K
¹ ¾ , ® ¹ w;®
0 ¹ w
0;®w + ®0w0 2 K
¹ ¾;
for each ¹ ¾ 2 §EN0.
Proposition 6 Let w;w0 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w;w0 2 K¾.
Let ®;®0 ¸ 0. Then
i) ®w + ®0w0 = ® ¹ w + ®0 ¹ w0;
ii) c®w+®0w0 = ®c ¹ w + ®0c ¹ w0.
[The NA-semimetric mcst situations ¹ w; ¹ w0;®w + ®0w0 are obtained via reduc-
tion of the weight functions w;w0;®w + ®0w0, respectively.]
Proof
i) Note that









= ® ¹ w(fi;jg) + ®0 ¹ w0(fi;jg);16
where the second equality follows from the fact that w;w0 and ®w+®0w0
all belong to K¾;
ii) Note that, by Lemma 2, ® ¹ w;®0 ¹ w0;®w + ®0w0 2 K¹ ¾ for some ¹ ¾ 2 §EN0.
For each S 2 2N nf;g, there is, according to Remark 3, a common mcst
¡S for ® ¹ w;®0 ¹ w0 and ®w + ®0w0. Hence
®c ¹ w(S) + ®0c ¹ w0(S) =
P
e2¡S ® ¹ w(e) +
P














where the third equality follows by (i).
Some interesting properties for multisolutions on mcst situations are the
following.
Property 1 The multisolution G is e±cient (EFF) if for each w 2 WN0 and
for each x 2 G(w) X
i2N
xi = w(¡);
where ¡ is a minimum cost spanning network for w on N0.
Property 2 The multisolution G has the positive (POS) property if for
each w 2 WN0 and for each x 2 G(w)
xi ¸ 0
for each i 2 N.
Property 3 The multisolution G has the Upper Bounded Contribution (UBC)






for each x 2 G(w).
Property 4 The multisolution G has the Cone-wise Positive Linearity (CPL)
property if for each ¾ 2 §EN0, for each pair of mcst situations w; b w 2 K¾
and for each pair ®; b ® ¸ 0, we have
G(®w + b ®b w) = ®G(w) + b ®G(b w):
[Here we denote by ®G(w) + b ®G(b w) the set f®x + b ®b xjx 2 G(w);b x 2 G(b wg.]17
Proposition 7 The Bird core BC satis¯es the properties EFF, POS, UBC
and CPL.
Proof Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Since
BC(w) = C(c ¹ w), the following considerations hold:
i) For each allocation x 2 BC(w),
P
i2N xi = w(¡) for some mcst ¡ by
the e±ciency property of the core of the game c ¹ w. So BC has the EFF
property.
ii) For each allocation x 2 BC(w), xi ¸ 0 for each i 2 N since the Bird
core is the convex hull of all Bird allocations in the mcst ¹ w, which are
vectors in I RN
+. So BC has the POS property.
iii) For each (w;N0)-component C 6= f0g and each x 2 BC(w)
X
i2Cnf0g
xi · c ¹ w(C n f0g) = min
i2Cnf0g
w(fi;0g)
by coalitional rationality of the core of the game c ¹ w. So BC has the
UBC property.
iv) Let ¾ 2 §EN0, let w;w0 2 WN0 be such that w;w0 2 K¾ and let
®;®0 ¸ 0. The core is in fact additive on the class of concave games
(see Dragan et al.(1989)). So,
BC(®w+®
0w
0) = C(c®w+®0w0) = ®C(c ¹ w)+®
0C(c ¹ w0) = ®BC(w)+®
0BC(w
0):
Hence BC has the CPL property.
Inspired by the axiomatic characterization of the P-value (Branzei et al.(2004))
we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The Bird core BC is the largest multisolution which satis¯es
EFF, POS, UBC and CPL, i.e. for each multisolution F which satis¯es
EFF, POS, UBC and CPL, we have F(w) µ BC(w), for each w 2 WN0.
Proof We already know by Proposition 7 that the Bird core BC satis¯es the
four properties EFF, POS, UBC and CPL.
Let ª : WN0 ³ I RN be a multisolution satisfying EFF, POS, UBC and CPL.
Let w 2 WN0 and ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. We have to prove that18
ª(w) µ BC(w).


























By the UBC property, for each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg and for each (e¾;k;N0)-












0 if 0 2 C















¾;k)j ¡ 1 = e
¾;k(¡);
where ¡ is a minimum spanning network on N0 for mcst situation e¾;k. By
the EFF property, we have
P
i2N xe¾;k
i = e¾;k(¡), and then inequalities in









0 if 0 2 C
1 if 0 = 2 C:
(18)
Now, consider the game ce¾;k corresponding to the simple mcst situation e¾;k.
Note that for each S 2 2N n f;g,
ce¾;k(S) = jfC : C is a (e
¾;k;N
0) ¡ component;C \ S 6= ;;0 = 2 Cgj;
which is the number of (e¾;k;N0)-components not connected to 0 in e¾;k with
at least one node in the player set S.19
By (18) and the POS property, it follows that
P
i2S xe¾;k
i · ce¾;k(S) and
together with the EFF property we have xe¾;k 2 C(ce¾;k) = BC(e¾;k). More-













2 C(c ¹ w) = BC(w):
(19)
Keeping into account relation (16), we have ª(w) µ BC(w).
6 Final remarks
This paper deals mainly with the monotonicity and additivity properties of
the Bird core. The attention to monotonicity properties of solutions for cost
and reward sharing situations is growing in the literature.
In Sprumont (1990) attention is paid to population monotonic allocations
schemes (pmas), in Branzei et al.(2001) and Voorneveld et al.(2002) to bi-
monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas) and in Branzei et al.(2002) to type
monotonic allocation schemes. For mcst-situations, the existence of popula-
tion monotonic allocation schemes was established in Norde et al.(2004). For
special directed mcst-situations also pmas-es exists as is shown in Moretti et
al.(2002).
In Tijs et al.(2004) so called obligation rules for mcst-situations turn out
to be cost monotonic and induce also a pmas. A special obligation rule is
the P-value discussed in Branzei et al.(2004) (see also Feltkamp et al.(1994),
Feltkamp (1995)). The P-value can be seen as a special selection of the
Bird core: it corresponds to the barycenter of the Bird core (cf. Moretti et
al.(2004), Berga~ ntinos and Vidal-Puga (2004)).
For additivity properties of solutions we refer to Branzei and Tijs (2001),
Tijs and Branzei (2002).
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